The Fact of Reason

What does it mean to act freely? In other words: How
can we practically and epistemologically specify
the ability that rational beings have to make things
happen in the world in a way that warrants that they
be held responsible? This book suggests a renewed
approach to this question, with the purpose of
avoiding dualistic consequences.

Kant tries to solve the free will problem by
defending the possibility of a metaphysical space for
freedom outside the realm of nature. Despite its
subtleties, his theory remains dualistic. In this
book, the problem is approached from a different
angle: Rather than starting out (negatively) with an
examination of the metaphysical possibility of
transcendental freedom, it is argued (positively)
that freedom is an analytical component of the
concept of action. If we start with the way we
actually recognise (our own and others ) actions as
free, we come to see that it is not a matter of
identifying and describing an inner quality, but a
matter of mutual recognition and acknowledgement.