Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

Max R. Bennett is Professor of Physiology and University Chair at the University of Sydney. He is a leading neurobiologist, specialising in research on the formation and function of the synapse. He is the author of many books and articles in neurobiology, including The Idea of Consciousness: Synapses and the Mind and A History of the Synapse. He is President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, the recipient of the Distinguished Achievement Medallion of the Australian Neuroscience Society, the Ramaciotti Medal and the Burnet Medal, and is an Officer of the Order of Australia. P. M. S. Hacker is a fellow of St John's College, Oxford. He is author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and a leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications on Wittgenstein is the monumental four volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations published by Blackwell, the first two volumes of which are co-authored with G. P. Baker.

Preface. Part I: Philosophical Problems In Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots: 1. The Early Growth Of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System. Aristotle, Galen And Nemesius: The Origins Of The Ventricular Doctrine. Fernel And Descartes: The Demise Of The Ventricular Doctrine. The Cortical Doctrine Of Willis And Its Aftermath. The Conception Of A Reflex: Bell, Magendie And Marshall Hall. Localizing Function In The Cortex: Broca, Fritz And Hitzig. The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System: Sherrington. 2. The Cortex And The Mind In The Work Of Sherrington And His Proteges. Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact. Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism. John Eccles And The 'Liaison Brain'. Wilder Penfield And The 'Highest Brain Mechanism'. 3. The Mereological Fallacy And Its Manifestation In Contemporary Neuroscientific Thought. Mereological Confusions In Cognitive Neuroscience: (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird). Methodological Qualms: (Ullman, P.S. Churchland, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner Squire And Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry). On The Grounds For Ascribing Psychological Predicates To A Being: (Crick, Baars). On The Grounds For Misascribing Psychological Predicates To An Inner Entity: (Damasio, Edelman And Tononi, Kosslyn And Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick). The Inner: (Damasio). Introspection: (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz). Privileged Access: Direct And Indirect: (Blakemore). Privacy Or Subjectivity: (Searle). The Meaning Of Psychological Predicates And How They Are Learnt: (Searle). Of The Mind And Its Nature: (Gazzaniga, Doty). Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: an Analysis: Preliminaries. Brain-Body Dualism: (Kandel Schwartz And Jessell, Libet). The Project: (Gazzaniga). The Category Of The Psychological: (Nagel, P.M. Churchland And P.S. Churchland). 4. Sensation and Perception. Sensation: (Searle, Libet, Geldard And Sherrick). Perception: (Ledoux, Crick). Perception As The Causation Of Sensations: Primary And Secondary Qualities: (Kandel Schwartz And Jessell, Rock). Perception As Hypothesis Formation: Helmholtz: (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young).